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* * * * * 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
 PROFESSOR GUTTMAN:  Good afternoon.  For those who may 
not know me, I’m Egon Guttman.  I am a professor here at American 
University Washington College of Law.  The Law Review awarded me 
the honor to introduce the keynote speaker of this symposium, Judge 
Stanley Sporkin. 
When I first met Judge Sporkin, he was part of that outstanding 
duo of securities lawyers that made the SEC the envy of all other U.S. 
government agencies.  Stanley Sporkin and Irv Pollock gave the lead 
by imbuing professionalism and competence in what was to become 
an outstanding U.S. independent agency, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).1  Irv went on to become a 
commissioner and Stanley Sporkin became the director of the 
Division of Enforcement.  Without losing the respect and affection of 
both the lawyers who came before him and the lawyers on his staff, 
Stanley Sporkin was a person who not only understood the issues, but 
also knew how to be fair and responsible in applying the powers that 
his division had over the future of issuers, broker-dealers, and the 
lawyers representing them. 
This often gave rise to some discussions I had with Stanley Sporkin 
regarding the ethics of some defendants’ counselors.  In many cases, 
after reviewing a Wells submission2 and the terms of an injunction 
negotiated by the staff that was to be placed before the Commission 
and the courts (terms under which the defendant, without admitting 
or denying liability agreed to refrain from further violations of 
securities law), the defendants often made public statements on the 
steps of the court that they only submitted to an injunction so as to 
allow them to continue to work for the betterment of the entity that 
                                                          
 1. Established in 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is 
charged with enforcing the nation’s security laws, promoting stability in the markets, 
and protecting investors.  SEC Website, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects 
Investors and Maintains Market Integrity, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. 
shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
 2. A “Wells submission” is named for John A. Wells, who chaired the SEC 
Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices that recommended the 
practice of using the submissions.  Joshua A. Naftalis, “Wells Submissions” to the SEC as 
Offers of Settlement Under Rule of Evidence 408 and their Protection from Third-Party 
Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1912, 1913 n.3 (2002).  In administrative hearings 
brought by the SEC, the SEC will normally conduct a pre-institution fact-finding 
investigation.  See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (outlining the procedure for making a Wells 
submission to the government).  The defendant is given the results of the 
investigation and is allowed to submit a written “Wells” statement presenting 
arguments against commencement of action.  Id. 
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had just been enjoined.  I often felt that this was a denial of liability 
and should have been followed by contempt proceedings.  But 
Stanley knew better. 
During Stanley Sporkin’s watch, the issue involving a lawyer in the 
firm of Kaye Scholer arose—a lawyer who went too far in 
representing his client to the extent that he became part of the 
problem.  The question, both as Director of Enforcement and later as 
judge, was posed by Stanley Sporkin, “Where were the lawyers?”3 
After twenty years at the SEC, Stanley Sporkin moved to the 
Central Intelligence Agency as general counsel where William Casey, 
a former chairman of the SEC, was the director.  At that agency, 
Stanley surrounded himself with a very competent group of lawyers, 
recruiting some from the SEC.  Five years later, President Reagan 
nominated Stanley Sporkin to the Federal District Court for the 
District of Columbia. 
One of the cases over which Judge Sporkin presided was that of the 
Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass’n,4 which had been assisted by the law 
firms of Kaye Scholer; Jones, Day, Reaves & Pogue; and Sidley & 
Austin—pillars of the legal profession—as well as the accounting firm 
of Ernst & Ernst.  This was 1990 when proceedings involving the law 
firms and the auditing firms, such as Arthur Andersen, Touche Ross 
& Co., et cetera, were being settled.5 
In 1992, Judge Sporkin addressed the Securities Regulation 
Institute on The New World of Lawyering: The Need for Separate Codes of 
Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties.6  In this talk, he tackled 
the question of how far counsel should go in devising strategies in the 
corporate takeover area, asking whether the legal system was always 
ethically served by those who devised and used tactics such as “poison 
pills,”7 “scorched earth,”8 or “green mail.”9 
                                                          
 3. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) 
(Sporkin, J.) (asking specifically “where . . . were the outside accountants and 
attorneys when these transactions were effectuated?”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Reid Anthony Muoio, An Independent Auditor’s Suit for Wrongful Discharge, 
58 ALB. L. REV. 413, 413 (1994) (commenting on how the savings and loan scandal 
led to a drastic increase in suits against the largest accounting firms, which often 
ended in settlements totaling hundreds of millions of dollars). 
 6. Judge Stanley Sporkin, The New World of Lawyering: The Need for Separate Code of 
Conduct for the Various Specialties, 18 S.F. ATT’Y 17 (1992). 
 7. Poison pill is defined as “a corporation’s defense against an unwanted 
takeover bid whereby shareholders are granted the right to acquire equity or debt 
securities at a favorable price to increase the bidder’s acquisition costs.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1177 (7th ed. 1999). 
 8. Scorched earth is defined as “an anti-takeover tactic by which a target 
corporation sells its most valuable assets or divisions in order to reduce its value after 
acquisition and thus try to defeat a hostile bidder’s tender offer.” Id. at 1348. 
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But above all, his question, “Where were the lawyers?,” still requires 
an answer and must still be asked in the environment we live in after 
disclosure of activities by lawyers and accountants in Enron, 
WorldCom, et cetera.10  What remains to be seen is whether the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act11 will clarify the duties of an attorney.  The Act 
itself, however, is vague.  It calls upon the SEC to promulgate rules 
calling upon attorneys to “report evidence of a material violation of 
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation” by the 
company or agency thereof.12  The term “material” has repeatedly 
raised the specter of vagueness, causing litigation—a problem 
compounded by the use of the phrase “similar violation.” 
The SEC proposed rule13 raises even more issues in its attempts to 
implement the Act and regulate attorney functions.  It creates a new 
securities law offense applicable solely to attorneys.14  In addition to 
the usual remedies, the SEC now would have statutory jurisdiction to 
discipline lawyers by a Rule 2(e) proceeding where the offense may 
not be clearly indicated by securities law.15  For example, where an 
attorney’s activities were non-conforming to the rule, the question is 
raised, does that make the attorney a party to an alleged statutory 
violation through nonfeasance in not giving the required notice, or 
the absence of a “noisy withdrawal”?  There are interesting points that  
were discussed this morning regarding this rule, and I keep on asking 
myself, does Sarbanes-Oxley really clarify the situation insofar as an 
                                                          
 9. Green mail is defined as “the act of buying enough stock in a company to 
threaten a hostile takeover and then selling the stock back to the corporation at an 
inflated price.” Id. at 709. 
 10. See Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned from ENRON’s Fall: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Professor Susan P. Koniak) 
(referring to Judge Sporkin’s question posed in the Savings & Loan case and 
answering it in regards to Arthur Andersen’s lawyers by stating that they were either 
encouraging the destruction of documents, ignoring the destruction, or negligently 
failing to preserve documents), available at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ejudiciary/ 
hearing. cfm?id=149 (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
 11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266). 
 12. Id. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).  
 13. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 71670, 71671 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 14. See id. at 71674 (requiring any attorney who appears or practices before the 
SEC to report evidence of any material violation up the corporate ladder until it is 
addressed).   
 15. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (reflecting the new redesignation of what was 
formerly known as Rule 2(e)); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71671 (describing the SEC’s ability to 
discipline attorneys under Rule 102(e)).  The SEC’s approach regarding the 
obligation to give notice in the form of a “noisy withdrawal” appears to reinforce the 
position of attorneys as counsel for the entity and its board or directors or other 
agents. 
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attorney being subject to Rule 2(e) is concerned? 
But, I’m going too far afield.  Judge Sporkin is known to all of us.  
His distinguished career has been widely recognized.  He received 
the Rockefeller Award for Public Service from Princeton University’s 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the 
President’s Award for Distinguished Federal Service, and the award 
given to him by the Association of Securities and Exchange 
Commission Alumni, the William O. Douglas Award for Lifetime 
Achievement in this area.  Judge Stanley Sporkin. 
JUDGE SPORKIN:  Thank you, Professor Guttman, for those very 
nice words.  After that speech, are there any questions? I don’t have 
to say anything, do I? 
Being here today sort of reminds me of the fellow who goes and 
visits an attorney and he says, “I need an attorney to represent me 
effectively and honestly.” The lawyer says, “make up your mind.” 
There are some new definitions.  You’ve heard of the word, 
“EBIT.”16  The new definition is “earnings before irregularities and 
tampering.” “CEO”17 is the “chief embezzlement officer.”  The 
“CFO”18 is the “chief corporate fraud officer.”  “PE”19 is “Parole 
Entitlement.” “EPS”20 is “eventual prison sentence.”  Momentum 
investing—the fine art of buying high and selling low.  Value 
investing—the art of buying low and selling lower.  Broker—what my 
broker has made me.  Bye-bye—a flight attendant making market 
recommendations as you get off the plane.  Standard & Poor—your 
life in a nutshell.  A market correction—the day after you buy stocks.  
Yahoo—what you yell after selling it to some poor sucker for $240 per 
share.  Windows 2000—what you jump out of when you’re the sucker 
that bought the Yahoo for $240 a share.  An institutional investor—
past years investor who is now locked up in a nuthouse. 
All right.  Enough of that.  You’ve got to wake yourself up after 
lunch, you know.  
We are really in troubled times.  We have had financial breakdowns 
that are literally off the charts.  Virtually every field of endeavor has 
been implicated and the daily revelations are an indictment of our 
system that has always been presumed to be honest and with a high 
degree of integrity.  The dishonest and unethical conduct cuts across 
                                                          
 16. “Earnings before interest and taxes.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, 
at 529. 
 17. “Chief Executive Officer.” Id. at 232. 
 18. “Chief Financial Officer.” 1 ACRONYMS, INITIALISM, & ABBREVIATIONS 834 
(Mary Rose Bonk ed., Thomson Learning 31st ed. 2002). 
 19. “Price Earnings Ratio.” Id. at 3365. 
 20. “Earnings Per Share.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 625. 
KEYNOTE.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:07 PM 
644 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:639 
the fields of all endeavors.  In recent times we have seen scandals in 
sports, the professions, the industrial and financial services 
community, and I might even add, in academia.  That is very 
distressing.  Of course, I am not even excluding government. 
Corruption big and small is rampant.  I marvel at the way our 
public officials react every time a new indiscretion is revealed.  Their 
professed naivete is wonderful to observe.  It reminds me of the 
fellow who comments after spending time in Las Vegas, “My, there is 
a lot of gambling going on in that city.”  Obviously, something has to 
be done about the present state of affairs. 
We, as citizens, have to rededicate our efforts to insist that our 
oversight bodies do more to make our societal institutions, both 
public and private, live up to the highest standards of honesty and 
ethical behavior.  Congress has now reacted with a vengeance.  It has 
passed legislation which is extremely far reaching.  The new 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation singles out four targets in its effort to make 
our corporations live up to their reputation for being the most 
honest and ethical in the world.21 
I must tell you that in all my years—and Professor Guttman, 
Professor Siegel, Professor Karmel and Professor Bauman . . . I think 
we could all agree that this is probably the farthest reaching 
legislation in the financial services field that I can remember.  It 
really just sort of engulfs us.  We do not realize how important it is 
going to be, but as the days go on, you are going to see what is 
happening. 
But, let us look and see what the legislation does.  What it does—it 
really targets the gatekeepers.  It targets the corporation’s top 
officers.22  They must certify now to their financial statements.23  It 
targets the professionals, the lawyers,24 and the accountants.25  It 
targets the corporate boards of directors.26 
Corporate law was always thought to be a prerogative of the states.  
Well, that is no longer the case.  The federal government has now 
                                                          
 21. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act targets corporate officers, lawyers, accountants and boards of directors). 
 22. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 777 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241) (requiring corporate officers to certify the 
accuracy and completeness of company reports). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245) (establishing 
standards of conduct for attorneys). 
 25. See id. § 105, 116 Stat. at 762 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215) (imposing 
sanctions on accountants who violate the Act). 
 26. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(1)) 
(establishing standards for audit committees which are comprised of members of a 
corporation’s board of directors). 
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gotten into the corporate governance field with a vengeance.  With 
respect to corporate officials, new and important duties are imposed 
on them.  The CEO and his chief operating officer must now 
personally certify to the accuracy of the corporation’s financial 
statements.27  If their statements turn out to be knowingly wrong, they 
face stiff civil and criminal penalties.28  They range from being barred 
from serving as an officer or a director of a public corporation, and 
having to pay back certain monies received from their corporation,29 
to spending ten to twenty years in prison for a knowing and willful 
violation.30  If you realize that now the federal government can 
determine who is going to be an officer and director, or discipline by 
exception who is going to be an officer or director, I think that 
probably exceeds even the widest corporate law, the most liberal 
corporate law, in the nation. 
Who makes that decision? It’s going to be really up to the SEC.  
They now can make that decision administratively.  You do not even 
have to go to court.  They have gone very far.  Maybe some might say, 
too far.  This may well be a question of whether they could go this far.  
This may well be a constitutional issue. 
The professionals who normally represent corporations, the 
accountants and the lawyers, are the second and third groups 
targeted in the new legislation.31 
Professor Guttman mentioned the Lincoln Savings & Loan case.32  
As Charlie Keating33 was trying to get back his savings and loan which 
had been taken from him, he brings a case and I get assigned to it as 
the judge.  It was an interesting case because everybody was afraid of 
Charles Keating for some reason and nobody wanted to call him as a 
witness.  I was sitting there trying to determine what I should do.  I 
                                                          
 27. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). 
 28. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (covering the range of civil and 
criminal penalties available under the Act). 
 29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 906, 116 Stat. at 806 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7215). 
 30. Id.  
 31. See id. §§ 307, 906, 116 Stat. at 784, 806 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7215, 
7245) (laying out the requirements imposed on corporate attorneys and 
accountants).  See generally President’s Remarks Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1283 (July 30, 2002) (discussing the focus and background 
of the Act and highlighting the various corporate players affected by the Act), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-1.html 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003). 
 32. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 33. Charles Keating, Jr., was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
American Continental Corporation (“ACC”), a company that developed and 
constructed single-family homes.  Id. at 906.  In 1980, Keating sought to expand 
ACC’s real estate business and acquired Lincoln Savings & Loan.  Id. 
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used a provision in the law that is rarely used by judges, and I called 
Mr. Keating as my witness.34 
I said, “What am I going to do about this?” Here I’ve got him as my 
witness.  I’ve done no preparation.  I had no discovery.  What does a 
lawyer do when he calls a witness and he doesn’t know what the 
witness is going to say? 
 I’ll do two things.  I will try to first of all be his lawyer.  So I will 
examine him directly, and then I will cross-examine him.  Because if I 
do the direct, I will get the information to cross-examine him.  Right? 
That is what I did.  I directed him.  It was interesting because he 
was a man in his late sixties and the first question I asked him, I said, 
“Mr. Keating, tell me something about yourself.  Who is Charles 
Keating? What’s your background?” He started to tell about his 
beginnings and what not.  Of course, he had humble beginnings.  He 
didn’t talk about any of the senators he knew but—then, of course, I 
cross-examined him.  It was during the cross-examination that I said, 
“Explain how you justify what you are doing here with all these funny 
transactions—transactions in which they were booking income in the 
millions and millions of dollars that didn’t really exist.”35 
The whole scheme was that he bought a savings and loan at a time 
when savings and loans were drags on the market and anybody could 
buy them.  He buys it, and he then has the billion dollar savings—he 
has a savings and loan with a billion dollars of investors’ money in it.  
This was the money, the billion dollars, he wanted to get his hands 
on. 
He knew that the regulators were looking at him because he had a 
history of having problems.  As a matter of fact, one of the problems 
he had was with the SEC.  I happened to be the Director of the 
Division of Enforcement at the time, but I didn’t know a whole lot 
about him.  In any event, this sort of came back the second time like a 
bad meal.  He has a scheme of how he is going to get the billion 
dollars—how is he going to get his hands on the billion dollars? 
The regulators are looking at him.  He tries to do a loan.  They say, 
“No, you can’t do the loan.” So, what he did was he took the savings 
and loan and he bought it with a corporation that he owned 100%.36  
                                                          
 34. FED. R. EVID. 614 (“The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of 
a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus 
called.”). 
 35. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 743 F. Supp. at 916-18 (explaining that Lincoln 
disguised transactions where it was required to lay out millions of dollars for the sole 
purpose of recording paper profits and upstreaming monies to its parent ACC, when 
its assets were dissipated without deriving any benefit for Lincoln). 
 36. Id. at 907-08. 
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That corporation had a $200 million tax loss carry forward.  His 
scheme was to get a tax-sharing agreement.37  The lawyers came up 
with the idea of a tax-sharing agreement, that is, the savings and loan 
and the parent company would be combined in paying taxes.  The 
savings and loan would send up, pursuant to GAAP accounting, their 
profits quarterly to the parent company.38  The parent company 
would then pay the taxes.39  But, if they have a $200 million tax carry 
forward, they don’t have to pay any taxes until they reach $200 
million in taxes.  At that point the corporate rate was fifty percent.  So 
he was able to keep fifty percent of any profit that the savings and 
loan was going to send up to him. 
In order to effectuate the scheme, the savings and loan had to 
make money because if you do not make money, then you can not 
send up any money.  What they did is they would go out and buy 
property worth $3 million, and then get somebody to buy it for $15 
million.  Then they would declare a profit of $12 million and send up 
$6 million to the parent company. 
They did this—various transactions used up the whole $200 
million.  In  that way he was able to get the money out of the savings 
and loan.  His testimony was, “But look, everything was done legally 
here.  I didn’t put my hand in the treasury.  I didn’t steal any money.” 
More important, he said, “I surrounded myself with many lawyers, 
many accountants, and they all approved these transactions.”40  The 
lawyers drafted the agreement.  So this thing was absolutely approved 
by lawyers, accountants, all the professionals.  He said, “Therefore, I 
did nothing wrong.” 
What I learned when I was on the bench was that in virtually every 
case there is a key to the case.  There is a key to the solution of the 
case and how you are going to come out.  How do you deal with the 
defenses?  As I was writing this opinion, it hit me like a ton of bricks.  
                                                          
 37. Under the tax-sharing agreement, Lincoln Savings & Loan was required to 
remit to ACC on a quarterly basis the amount of tax it would ostensibly owe to the 
Internal Revenue Service on the basis of its net profits, calculated pursuant to the 
application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”).  Id. at 908-09.  
What made this tax agreement advantageous to ACC was that ACC had many 
millions of dollars stored-up net operating loss carry forwards.  Id.  This meant that 
since ACC owned Lincoln and was responsible for the payment of taxes for the entire 
ACC consolidated group, including profits generated by Lincoln, it could keep the 
actual “tax” remitted by Lincoln without having to forward them to the U.S. 
Treasury.  Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 909 (noting that the tax-sharing agreement was approved by ACC’s 
Board through correspondence from Sydney Mar, Supervisory Agent, Andre 
Neibling, Lincoln’s chief executive officer, and Mark Sauter, ACC’s corporate 
counsel). 
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I said,  this is the answer: the answer is the professionals.  I said to 
myself, “Where were they?” “Why didn’t they do anything?”  “Why 
didn’t someone say something here?” I said that has got to be the 
solution. 
Not only did I figure out the solution to this case, but it actually 
turned out to be, as Professor Guttman said, the solution to many of 
the savings and loan cases in which there was overreaching during 
this period of time.  Indeed, Harris Weinstein, who was the lawyer for 
the Resolution Trust, or whatever the government agency was that 
was going after the money, picked up that theme.  He told me he 
picked it up, and then proceeded collecting hundreds of millions of 
dollars back from the insurance carriers of these law firms.41 
The key was the lawyers and accountants.  In my opinion, I asked 
that question, “Where were they?”42  Just think of the tremendous 
power of the profession—what they could have done, how they could 
be doing all these things.  So, isn’t it interesting now that some twelve 
years later, or even longer than that, we now have Sarbanes-Oxley and 
they pick up on that theme?  What they are doing is setting up this 
accountability board that is going to be looking at accounting firms, 
and if that board does its job, I think you are not going to see that 
type of accounting anymore.43 
The legislation is a heavy-handed kind of thing.  The kind of 
legislation that we would have never thought of being adopted by the 
U.S. government.  I mean, we have lived through government that is 
unbelievable.  First, it was the notion of not getting involved with the 
free enterprise system.  Let the free enterprise system do it, so we 
pulled down all those structures.  Now we have, in a Republican 
administration, probably the most bureaucratic organization that has 
been developed in many, many years coming into play. 
Now, you have in the legislation assignments being given to boards 
of directors, and assignments being given to audit committees.44  I 
                                                          
 41. See John H. Cushman, Jr., $400 Million Paid by S&L Auditors, Settling U.S. Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at A1 (announcing that Ernst & Young settled with the 
government in its case alleging that the accounting firm “improperly audited 
federally insured banks and savings institutions that later failed”); Stephen Labaton, 
$400 Million Bargain for Ernst, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at D1 (defining the 
Resolution Trust Corporation as the “federal savings and loans bail out agency”); id. 
(indicating that Harris Weinstein was the Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, which also assisted in the resolution of the savings and loans scandal). 
 42. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 743 F. Supp. at 920. 
 43. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 2, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 746-47 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213) (directing the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, a creation of the Act, to conduct investigations and related 
disciplinary proceedings for public accounting firms). 
 44. See id., 116 Stat. at 747 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201(3)(A)) (allowing 
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don’t think there is any state statute that talks about audit 
committees.  That’s now a legal requirement.  I don’t know whether 
you have to have audit committees, but they talk in terms of the audit 
committee, the independence of the committees, and things of that 
kind. 
You really are going to have a tremendous amount of federalism 
that is creeping in.  The thing that I wanted to mention here, because 
I’m in a law school here, is what I think about the responsibility of the 
law schools.  What sort of always bothered me was this tremendous 
leap from academia to the practice of law.  It is a sea change.  It is 
incredible to be able to go directly from the theoretical out to the 
real world.  It is traumatic to many of the students, and indeed, there 
are many students that do not practice, instead that quit and say, “We 
can’t take it.”  It seems to me there has got to be some kind of a 
bridge in that gap. 
Law clerking was sort of a half-way house I used to find when I used 
to bring in clerks.  Because you still have the theoretical approach 
and also a lot of the practical.  You see the cases coming and all that.  
That is one way to do it, but I do not know if you have come up with 
other ways to deal with this. 
The other thing that I think is necessary is noting the tremendous 
pressures that new associates are put under when they go into 
practice.  This leaves them very few places to which they can turn.  
They might have a concern—and many times they raise concerns 
which are really not concerns.  But, in any event, there ought to be 
some mechanism in the law firm where an associate can go to get 
answers. 
I am not talking about an ethics officer.  I am talking about 
someone the young associate in a law firm can go to when confronted 
with what we recently read in the paper where law firms have 2200 
billable hours a year required minimums.  That is a lot of hours and I 
hope you students know that.  There has to be someplace in the law 
firm you can turn, and I do not know whether the firms have that 
kind of a person who is dedicated to the associate, and not dedicated 
to the firm itself. 
                                                          
audit committees to be established by and amongst the corporation’s board of 
directors to oversee accounting and financial reporting); see, e.g., Paul Sweeney & 
Cynthia Waller Vallario, NYSE Sets Audit Committees on New Road, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 
(Nov. 2002) (discussing proposed New York Stock Exchange standards requiring 
member companies’ audit committees to assume responsibility for their fiduciary 
obligations and elevated obligations for committee decision making), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/nov2002/sweeney.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
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What I think you need is in the law school.  Do you have 
counseling that goes to your student who is out working, as opposed 
to someone who wants a career change or something like that? In 
other words, do you have somebody who, if the law firm does not 
provide it, you can provide it to your recent graduates where they can 
come to you and say, “Here’s my problem, what am I going to do?” 
I am trying to tell you about these tremendous pressures that are 
being imposed.  I believe these are ethical pressures and every other 
kind of pressure.  I really believe that the law school, in its education 
of its people going out into the real world as well as post-education 
help, can have a movement in which to deal with these law firms and 
try to negotiate something with them to change the ways that they are 
operating. 
I chose not to go into the private practice of law until after I 
completed my public service career and had the greatest fulfillment 
that anybody could ever have.  It was only after all that that I decided 
to come and practice law outside governmental service.  Only after I 
had the financial stability that nobody could do anything to me.  The 
worst thing that could happen to me is I could go to the beach 
somewhere and have a good time for the rest of my life. 
I do not want to say that has to be the route that everybody here 
ought to take or the route that everybody could take.  It seems to me 
that there has got to be some kind of a conversation or dialogue 
between the academy and the profession to somehow find out what 
those issues are, what those problems are, and to try to deal with 
them.  In that way, I think, we’re going to see the ethical standards go 
up and everything else.  But you have to do it. 
Any questions? 
SPEAKER:  There was a lot of discussion before about the role of 
the attorneys, and I was frankly mystified that this was not a violation 
of attorney-client privilege. 
JUDGE SPORKIN:  Well, it is called the “laddering up” process.45  
What you are going to be facing, there is—if it’s good hard 
information, I agree with you 100%.  If you have information that the 
company’s violating the law and you bring it to the general counsel’s 
attention, and he brings it, or should bring it, to the CEO’s attention 
and nothing is done, then you go to the board.46 
                                                          
 45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2000) (allowing an attorney to 
escalate a problem up the corporate ladder if necessary to protect client interests). 
 46. See id. R. 1.13(b) (permitting an attorney to take measures, such as “referring 
the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the 
seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act on behalf of 
the organization” when the company is violating the law). 
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You are right.  There is no violation of any attorney-client privilege.  
There is no violation of anything there.  I do not understand why 
there should be any real question raised. 
As a matter of fact, there may come a time where that person might 
have to go to the shareholders, and even there, there is a real 
question of whether there is a violation of the attorney-client 
privilege.47  Because if somebody in the corporation is acting contrary 
to the interests of the shareholders—take a case recently, we won’t 
mention any names, of somebody taking all kinds of money from the 
company.  Should the shareholders know that? I mean why shouldn’t 
the shareholders . . . how could there conceivably be a violation of 
the attorney-client privilege? Who is it to protect? 
There really is an issue there of who is the client.48  One of the 
things that I have been thinking about is [who is the client].  There is 
a problem there—clearly it is not the CEO.  It can not be the CEO 
unless the CEO is going to pay that person out of his own pocket.  As 
long as he is using or she is using corporation funds, it should be 
that. 
It may be that you might want to write in the bylaws of a company 
as to who the lawyer is to report to and that might clear it up a little 
bit as to where that privilege lies and who can exercise that privilege.  
Nobody that I know has gone that far by putting it into the bylaws, to 
at least define who the client is for the lawyer. 
I think the general counsels of law firms—no, the general counsels 
of corporations, before they take that position, should have it as clear 
as possible who that general counsel is going to report to. 
There are a lot of overbearing CEOs that think that because they 
hire the general counsel the general counsel better be beholden to 
that person.  I think it is a tough job to be a general counsel of a 
corporation.  I think it is a very difficult job. 
SPEAKER:  After you asked that question, “Where were the lawyers 
and law firms who have millions of dollars,” has the organized bar 
focused on what the ethics rule should be? What is your view of the 
bar’s response to that ten years leading up to Section 307?49 
                                                          
 47. Id.; see also id. R. 1.6(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from revealing client 
information related to representation unless the client consents or the disclosure is 
necessary to carry out the representation). 
 48. See id. R. 1.13(a) (stating that an attorney employed by an organization 
represents the organization through its constituents).  See generally Ralph Jonas, Who 
is the Client?: The Corporate Lawyer’s Dilemma, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1988) (noting the 
conflict in representing a publicly-held corporation, where the attorney is retained by 
and reports to the officers and directors of the corporation, but the shareholders are 
collectively the owners of the corporation). 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (codifying § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 
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JUDGE SPORKIN: You and I both know that—the distinction that 
you have here, that these kinds of offenses that we are seeing are not 
the offenses of the two bit crook that is going to come in with a crow 
bar and hit you on the head and take your money.  They were done 
with the semblance of complying with the law. 
With every one of these, I think you are going to find lawyers were 
involved in drafting documents.  Accountants were involved.  What 
they were doing is looking like a horse running down the racetrack 
with blinders on.  They were not looking at a broader concept. 
Why are they being asked to draft this document? How is this 
document going to be used? Why are they trying to—I mean at some 
point, lawyers don’t get it.  They do not make any judgments.  All 
they do is write what people tell them to write.  That is clearly not the 
way it works.  
We have to start thinking more in the box now.  As I have said to 
others, this is the year of the nerd lawyer, the person that is going to 
be fairly conservative.  Maybe we need that respite.  Maybe we need 
that period to sort of—before the grass starts to grow or the trees, or 
the shrubs start to grow again.  I think it is a good awakening. 
Is it going to happen again? Of course it is going to happen.  
Everybody wants to game the system and that is what you had here.  
What we have to find out is, where did this all start?  Where did these 
SPEs,50 and all of this other stuff that we’re seeing, all originate?  If we 
could find out where it all originated, then we could probably deal 
with it. 
I do not believe, for example, that it all originated with Enron.  I 
do not believe that those people sat down there and said, “We’re 
going to have SPEs,” “we’re going to do all these others.” I believe 
they had advisors that told them.  I believe it was more than just the 
lawyers and accountants.  It probably goes back to Wall Street where 
you have a lot of brilliant smart people.  They are always figuring out 
how they can do things to get the—you know, to get a leg up on 
matters. 
                                                          
107-204, 116 Stat. 745, and setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct 
for attorneys appearing and practicing before the SEC in representation of public 
companies). 
 50. Kathleen Day & Peter Behr, Enron Directors Backed Moving Debt Off Books,  
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (explaining that Enron approved controversial 
partnerships, which implemented aggressive accounting tactics that moved losses off 
the books, and that whose losses eventually contributed to the company’s 
bankruptcy); Ronald Fink & Marie Leone, Partners to the End?, CFO.COM, Jan. 28, 
2002 (indicating that Enron used special purpose entities (SPE) to conceal its debt 
and increase its income), at http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,6613|||2,00.html. 
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I think that we have to find out where it all started and—because 
otherwise we are not going to be able to deal with the problem.  It is 
going to be like you get roaches or something.  Unless you get back 
to the nest, they’ll come back again. 
PROFESSOR GUTTMAN:  Let me just say this one point that 
everybody who is going to practice at the bar will have to remember.  
That is, learn to know who is your judge.  Mr. Keating did not realize 
that Judge Sporkin knew accounting and he was addressing him, “you 
know how we do things in business.” But Judge Sporkin knew that 
you don’t do that in accounting.  Thank you very much, Judge 
Sporkin. 
WHEREUPON, A RECESS WAS TAKEN 
 
